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1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The City agrees with the standard of review set forth by the Plaintiffs.  (See 
Appellant Brief at 1.)  The City would add that with respect to interpreting the City’s 
ordinances, the Court should review them for correctness, but also “afford some level of 
non-binding deference to the interpretation advanced by the local agency.”  M&S Cox 
Investments, LLC, 2007 UT App 315, ¶ 29, 169 P.3d 789 (citing Carrier v. Salt Lake 
County, 2004 UT 98, ¶ 28, 104 P.3d 1208)).  In fact, “in close cases [the agency’s] 
interpretation may be a determinative factor in choosing a particular interpretation over 
another.”  Id., ¶ 29 (Carrier, 2004 UT 98, ¶ 39). 
The City agrees that the issues presented by the Plaintiffs were presented to the 
district court and preserved for review.  (See Appellant Brief at 1-3.) 
Issue 1: Should the Court of Appeals affirm the district court’s finding that the 
Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim fails as a matter of law because the City has legal 
authority to retain parking revenue and enforce parking ordinances using updated 
technology.  (This issue was preserved for appeal at R: 514-15, 100-104.) 
Issue 2: Should the Court of Appeals affirm the district court’s holding that the 
Plaintiffs did not voluntarily pay their parking notices under duress, fraud, or mistake and 
thus are precluded from seeking a refund in equity?  (This issue was preserved for appeal 
at R: 513, 146, 208-215.) 
2 
Issue 3:  Should the Court of Appeals affirm the district court’s holding that the 
Plaintiffs knowingly waived their right to challenge the constitutionality of the City’s 
parking notices and subsequent hearing process by paying the notices without challenge?  
(This issue was preserved for appeal at R: 512, 91-95.) 
Issue 4:  Should the Court of Appeals affirm the district court’s finding that the 
City’s process satisfies the demands of due process and that the Plaintiffs were provided 
constitutionally adequate notice, even assuming some misinformation or omissions? 
(This issue was preserved for appeal at R: 513-14, 95-100, 495-502.) 
Issue 5:  Should the Court of Appeals affirm the district court’s holding that the 
Plaintiffs do not have traditional or public interest standing to seek a refund of fees and 
costs they were never assessed? (This issue was preserved for appeal at R: 511-12, 104-
105, 473-476.) 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
 The constitutional provisions, statutes, and ordinances relevant to this appeal are 
included in the attached addendum.    
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND THE FACTS 
Between 2012 and 2014, the Plaintiffs either parked without paying or left their 
vehicles in the parking spot for longer than the two-hour limit in violation of Salt Lake 
City Code section 12.56.150, the “overtime parking” ordinance, and section 12.56.190, 
the “expired meter” ordinance (collectively, the “Operative Ordinances”).  These 
3 
ordinances were adopted when the City utilized coin-operated parking meters.  The 
ordinances defined parking meter as “any mechanical device installed within or upon a 
curb or sidewalk area immediately contiguous to a parking meter space which, when the 
mechanism thereof is set in motion, indicates unexpired parking time for the adjacent 
parking vehicle.”  Salt Lake City Code § 12.56.140(A).  A parking meter space is defined 
as “adjacent” to the parking meter on the street.  Id.  
In 2012, the City removed coin-operated meters and installed blue parking stations 
that served the same function as the coin-operated meters but with updated technology.  
Under the new system, a numbered sign post contiguous with each space directs the user 
to parking pay stations on the same block face.  (R. 42.)  The numbered sign post states 
that pay-for-parking is limited to two hours during certain times.  (R. 558-59.)1  That 
information is repeated on the parking kiosk.  Consistent with section 12.56.150(B), the 
blue parking stations allow a user to “immediately deposit[] coins,” although the user can 
also use their Smart phone or credit card to pay for parking.  (R. 43.)  As required by 
section 12.56.150(B), payment also sets “in operation the timing mechanism” in the 
parking pay stations, which is recorded and provided to the user in the form of a receipt.  
(R. 43.)  This receipt tells the user when the time allotted for parking will expire.  (R. 
559.)     
                                                 
1  The City provided pictures of the parking signs at the Motion to Dismiss hearing 
to which the Plaintiffs did not object.  (R. 558.)  The Court could evaluate these photos 
without converting the motion into one for summary judgment because the parking pay 
stations and the signs were referenced at length in the complaint.  See Oakwood Village 
LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ¶ 13, 104 P.3d 1226.  
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A. The Plaintiffs’ Paid Their Parking Notices Without Challenge or Protest. 
The Plaintiffs paid all of their parking tickets without protest or contest except in 
one ironic instance where Mr. Bivens challenged his parking ticket and won.  Bivens 
received eight notices of parking violations for an “expired meter” and one citation for 
“overtime parking.”  (R. 38.)  In all but one instance, he paid the associated $15 fee 
without challenge.  (R. 38-39.)  Mr. Bivens contested one parking notice, number 
AA241618, in a small claims court action, Salt Lake City Corp. v. Bivens, Salt Lake City 
Justice Court case no. 137406902.  (R. 39.)  Before he appeared in Small Claims court he 
attempted to resolve his ticket before a hearing officer and was provided the Small 
Claims Court Information document.  (Id.)  Despite having received this document, 
Bivens challenged the validity of the underlying ordinance in Small Claims court.  (Id.)  
Although the judge did not rule on the validity of the underlying ordinance, the Court did 
dismiss Bivens’ ticket, and he paid nothing.  (Id.)  
Despite having one ticket dismissed, Bivens did not avail himself of the City’s 
process again.  He paid fees associated with five additional notices after he won his Small 
Claims court case.  (R. 9, 39.)  He paid his parking notices even though he believed that 
the City could not legally enforce the Operative Ordinances.  (R. 38.)  In the complaint, 
Bivens does not allege that he paid his tickets because he was threatened, defrauded, 
mistaken, or confused.  (R. 38-39.)  He paid his tickets simply because the benefits of 
payment outweighed the risks.  (R. 39.) 
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Arias received approximately 26 parking notices for an “expired meter” and five 
notices for “overtime parking” between 2012 and April of 2014.  (R. 40.)  In three 
instances, the fee associated with the parking notice increased by $40 because Arias did 
not pay the notice within 10 days.  (R. 40.)  He does not allege that he paid for parking 
but the City made a mistake in issuing the ticket.  He does not allege that he was 
confused by the parking pay stations or that they malfunctioned.  He does not allege that 
he thought the City’s expired meter and overtime parking ordinances were unenforceable.  
(See R. 39-40.)  He does not allege that he was forced to pay or that the City defrauded 
him.  (R. 39-40.)  Other than receiving a notice, he does not allege that he received any 
other communication from the City pressuring him to pay, including the Small Claims 
Court Information document.  (Id.)  He paid all of the fees associated with each notice 
without contest.  (R. 40.)  
Reed purportedly received one parking notice for an expired meter in May 2013.  
(R. 40.)  Ms. Reed alleges that she paid for the wrong parking spot.  (R. 40-41.)  Instead 
of challenging the ticket personally, Ms. Reed sent a friend to meet with a hearing officer 
to request that the ticket be dismissed.  (R. 41.)  Purportedly, the hearing officer denied 
the request, and her friend was given the Small Claims Court Information document.  (R. 
41.)  Reed considered challenging the ticket in small claims court but decided against it 
because of the filing fees and other costs she might have to pay if she lost.  (R. 41.)  She 
paid the $55 parking fee.  (R. 41.)   
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B. Parking Notice. 
 The parking notices received by the Plaintiffs have a similar form.  (R.51, 88-89, 
107-110, 126.)  The front page states that the document is a “Notice of Parking 
Violation” issued by the City.  (R. 126.)  The time, date, issuing officer, vehicle 
description, and location of the violation are listed.  (Id.)  The Notice lists the ordinance 
purportedly violated and the nature of the violation (i.e., “expired meter”) is listed.  (R. 
126.)  The $15 fee is listed, as well as the increased amount if the Notice is not paid 
within 10 days.  (Id.)  The notice warns that “failure to follow the instructions on the back 
of this notice may result in increased cost and penalties as provided by law.”  (Id.)  The 
notice warns that outstanding parking notices may result in the vehicle being impounded 
or booted.  (Id.)   
 The back of the notice provides the recipient information about paying the notice 
or contesting it.  (R. 110.)  With respect to a hearing, the notice states: “HEARINGS - To 
discuss your Parking Notice, you must see the Hearing Officer in person within 10 
calendar days from the date of this notice at the Salt Lake City & County Building at 451 
South State Street, Room 145.  Hearing Officers are available Monday, Tuesday, 
Thursday, Friday – 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Wednesday – 9:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.  We are 
closed on legal holidays and the day after Thanksgiving (excluding Columbus Day).  If 
you need additional information please call 801-535-6116, or email at 
parking@slcgov.com.”  (Id.)  The back of the notice further provides that “[f]ailure to 
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pay the penalty may result in the filing of a SMALL CLAIMS COURT ACTION and 
increased penalties.”  (Id.)  
 In thirty-nine of the forty-one tickets received by Plaintiffs, the Parking Notice 
was the only document provided them by the City.  (R. 38-41.)   
C. The City’s Process for Contesting Parking Notices. 
Only Bivens availed himself of the City’s two-tiered process for contesting 
parking tickets.  As the Parking Notice makes clear, the first step in the process is to 
appear in front of a hearing officer to challenge the notice.  See Salt Lake City Ordinance 
§ 12.56.570.  Recipients of notice of parking violations may “appear before a hearing 
officer and present and contest such alleged unauthorized use” of the streets.  Salt Lake 
City Ordinance § 12.56.570.B.  Hearing officers may find that “no unauthorized use 
occurred and dismiss the ticket.”  Id., 12.56.570.D.  They may also dismiss or reduce the 
fee amount in certain circumstances.  Id., 12.56.570.E, -F.  If a parking notice recipient 
cannot resolve the notice with a hearing officer and still wishes to contest the ticket, the 
officer helps the individual prepare paperwork to get the issue before a small claims court 
judge.  (R. 52)  The only time Bivens utilized this process, his ticket was dismissed.  (R. 
39.) 
D. Small Claims Court Information Document. 
Bivens went through the two-tiered hearing process once and ultimately paid 
nothing.  (R. 39.)  Reed reviewed the Small Claims Court Information document, which 
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is provided to notice recipients if they cannot resolve their tickets before the hearing 
officer.  (R. 52.)2  It tells recipients that if they’d like “to contest a parking/civil notice 
before a judge, a court date will be scheduled” and the appropriate documents initiating 
the small claims court process will “be prepared for you to sign.”  (Add. at 8-9.)  Reed 
decided not to appeal because of the possible consequences of losing.  (R. 41.)  The 
Small Claims Court Information document indicates that if the ticket recipient loses in 
Small Claims court, possible expenses include a filing fee, the outstanding parking fee, 
and the possible addition of the City’s attorneys’ fees.  (R. 53.)  The judgment could also 
affect credit ratings.  Id.  In addition to these warnings, the Small Claims Court 
Information document states: “If the judge finds in your favor, you will not have to pay 
anything and the small claims court case and parking/civil notice will be dismissed, 
unless it is appealed by the City.”  (Add. at 8-9.)   
E.   Complaint. 
The Plaintiffs filed the Amended Complaint on August 1, 2014, months and years 
after they voluntarily paid their parking tickets.  They allege (1) unjust enrichment and 
(2) a state due process claim.  (R. 59-64).  They seek a “refund” of (1) all parking 
revenue collected from parking pay stations; (2) all parking notice revenue; and (3) all 
court filing fees, attorneys’ fees, and collection costs for a two year period between 
                                                 
2  The Plaintiffs provided the district court with a copy of the Small Claims Court 
Information document at the motion to dismiss hearing.  (R. 585.)   
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March of 2012 and July 15, 2014.  (R. 60, 65.)  The Plaintiffs filed the Amended 
Complaint as a proposed class action.  (R. 54.)   
F. The City’s Motion to Dismiss, Argument, and Decision of the Court. 
The City moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) on September 17, 2014, arguing 
that (1) the Plaintiffs waived their claims by paying their parking tickets without contest; 
(2) the Plaintiffs received procedural due process; (3) the Plaintiffs cannot establish an 
unjust enrichment claim as a matter of law; and (4) the Plaintiffs lack standing to seek a 
refund of money they did not pay.  (R. 80-110, 123-126.)  The Plaintiffs contested each 
of these grounds.  Notably, the Plaintiffs argued that they paid their tickets under fraud, 
duress, and mistake, all exceptions to voluntary payment.  Additionally, they argued that 
they could seek a refund of all fees under public interest standing.   
The Court heard argument on December 4, 2014.  (R. 551.)  At the hearing and 
during briefing, the Plaintiffs rested solely on the strength of their legal position.  As 
Judge Faust commented at the end of the hearing, “the evidence is really . . ., from what 
I’m hearing, uncontested.”  (R. 612.)  Counsel for the Plaintiffs stated that if he felt there 
were factual issues that would preclude dismissal, he would “put that in sort of a Rule 56 
kind of . . . notation” in the requested draft memorandum decision.  (R. 613.)  Plaintiffs 
never asked the Court to deny the City’s motion because additional discovery was 
needed.  After the hearing, the Court ordered that each party submit a proposed 
memorandum decision, which they did.  (R. 611, 441-465, 468-504.)   
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Judge Faust ruled on February 27, 2015.  (R. 507-516.)  First, he found that the 
Plaintiffs lacked public interest standing to seek a refund of fees they never paid.  (R. 
510-512.)  Second, the court found that the Plaintiffs knowingly “waived their right to 
challenge the constitutionality or enforceability of the parking notices at issue by 
voluntarily paying them without challenge.”  (R. 512.)  The Court found no legal or 
factual support for their claims of duress, fraud, or mistake of fact.  (R. 512-13.)  Third, 
he found no due process violation, even assuming mistakes in the City’s notices as 
identified by the Plaintiffs.  (R. 513-14.)  Finally, he found that the Plaintiffs could not 
meet the elements of an unjust enrichment claim as a matter of law.  (R. 514-515.)  The 
Court entered a final order granting the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice on 
July 20, 2015.  (R. 544-548.)   
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Salt Lake City has had the authority to regulate parking on its streets for decades.  
As part of its authority, it requires users to pay to park in some downtown spaces.  Pay-
for-parking spaces can be used for a maximum of two hours.  In 2012, the City updated 
the technology it used to regulate parking by removing old coin-operated meters and 
installing parking pay stations, which accept coins, as well as Smart phone and credit 
card payments.  The City revised its parking ordinances in 2014 to reflect the 
technological change.   
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Between 2012 and 2014, the Plaintiffs received multiple parking notices for 
parking without paying or leaving their cars longer than the two-hour limit.  In almost 
every case, the Plaintiffs paid the associated $15 penalty or $55 penalty without contest.  
(In one instance, Plaintiff Bivens challenged his parking notice in Small Claims court and 
won.)   
The Plaintiffs now ask that the Court order the City to give them back the money 
that they voluntarily paid.  Their request includes every two dollar fee they paid to park 
for two hours and all payments of parking notices.  The Plaintiffs additionally seek all 
parking revenue the City received between 2012 and 2014, on behalf of a putative class.  
For multiple reasons, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to these extraordinary damages.   
First, the Plaintiffs argue that it is unjust of the City to keep parking revenue and 
collect penalties for parking violations because it did not update its ordinances to reflect 
the 2012 technological update to parking pay stations until 2014.  Their unjust 
enrichment claim fails for two reasons.  First, the Plaintiffs cannot establish that the City 
has retained a benefit that would be “inequitable” for it to keep, given its uncontested 
authority to regulate parking.  Second, the Plaintiffs had a legal remedy in the form of a 
hearing that they failed to utilize, which precludes a remedy in equity. 
Second, by voluntarily paying their parking notices without contest, the Plaintiffs 
cannot seek a refund in equity now.  The Plaintiffs’ argument that the Operative 
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Ordinances were invalid and that the City proceeded in the wrong venue are not 
exceptions to the voluntary waiver doctrine. 
Third, the Plaintiffs waived their right to challenge the constitutionality of the 
City’s process.  Utah case law and persuasive authority are clear that the Plaintiffs cannot 
argue that the City deprived them of their property without process when they gave up 
their property without utilizing that process.   
 Fourth, the Plaintiffs’ due process claim fails because the notice provided by the 
City was adequate.  As is constitutionally required, the Parking Notices reasonably 
apprised the Plaintiffs of the violation and gave them an opportunity to respond.  The 
Parking Notice itself told the recipient that he or she could pay the penalty or contest the 
ticket by speaking with a hearing officer within ten days of receiving the notice.  A phone 
number, email address, and physical address (including hours of operation) were all 
provided.  The Court’s analysis of Bivens and Arias due process claim ends here.   
 Reed considered proceeding in Small Claims court but decided against it after 
considering information the City provided about costs.  The Small Claims Court 
Information document informed Reed that if she lost the hearing, she could be assessed 
filing fees, collection costs, and attorneys’ fees.   
 The Court need not consider the constitutionality of the hearing process because 
none of the Plaintiffs suffered a constitutional injury after availing themselves of the 
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second hearing in Small Claims court.  Consequently, they lack standing to challenge that 
process.  
Finally, the Plaintiffs lack standing to recover collection fees, court filing costs, 
and attorney fees because they were never assessed these amounts.  The public interest 
exception to traditional standing does not apply because their claim for a windfall of 
money they never paid lacks significant public importance.   
I. THE PLAINTIFFS’ UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM FAILS AS A 
MATTER OF LAW.  
 
The Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim fails as a matter of law.  In 2012, the City 
updated the technology it used to enforce a decades-old statutory right to regulate parking 
on the streets.  The Plaintiffs seek to exploit perceived discrepancies between the new 
technology and the Operative Ordinances to obtain a “refund” of all of the revenue paid 
into parking pay stations over the past two years in addition to any fees paid for parking 
violations.  (R. 65-66.) The Plaintiffs’ claim for unjust enrichment fails for two reasons.  
First, the Plaintiffs cannot meet the third element of unjust enrichment because there is 
nothing inequitable about the City retaining parking revenue between 2012 and 2014.  
Second, the Plaintiffs have a legal remedy that they failed to utilize so they cannot pursue 
an equitable claim.   
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A. The City Acts Equitably in Retaining Parking Revenue or Fees 
Incurred Between 2012 and 2014 Because The City Had Legal 
Authority to Regulate Parking.  
 
A claim for unjust enrichment requires the Plaintiff to prove three elements: “(1) a 
benefit conferred on one person by another; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the 
conferee of the benefit; and (3) the acceptance or retention by the conferee of the benefit 
under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit 
without payment of its value.”  Espinoza v. Gold Cross Servs., Inc., 2010 UT App 151, ¶ 
10, 234 P.3d 156 (internal citations omitted).  In elaborating on the third element, the 
Utah Supreme Court clarified that “[i]t is not enough that a benefit was conferred on the 
defendant, rather, the enrichment to the defendant must be unjust in that the defendant 
received a true windfall, or ‘something for nothing.’”  Emergency Physicians Integrated 
Care v. Salt Lake Cnty, 2007 UT 72, ¶ 26, 167 P.3d 1080 (citing 66 Am. Jur. 2d 
Restitution and Implied Contracts § 13 (2001)).  
It is not unjust for the City to keep parking revenue, because it has had statutory 
authority to keep these types of funds for decades.  See Nasfell v. Ogden City, 249 P.2d 
507, n.3 (Utah 1952) (citing a 1943 statute authorizing the regulation of “parking of 
vehicles including the requirement of payment of a parking fee”).  Utah Code section 10-
8-11, in effect since 1953, provides that municipalities may “regulate the use of streets, 
alleys, [and] avenues . . . [and] prevent and remove obstructions and encroachments 
thereon . . . .”  Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-11 (1953).  State code provides the City with 
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authority to pass ordinances to implement its “powers and duties,” including the right to 
enforce those ordinances “with fines and penalties.”  Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84; see also 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-703(2) (providing that a municipality may “prescribe a civil 
penalty for the violation of any municipal ordinance by a fine not to exceed” that given 
for a class B misdemeanor).3  
Since the City has the statutory authority to regulate parking, the Court must give 
the Operative Ordinances the presumption of validity.  Call v. City of W. Jordan, 614 
P.2d 1257, 1258 (Utah 1980) (“Once it is determined that a municipal ordinance is within 
the scope of powers granted by the legislature . . . the ordinance is entitled to the 
presumption of constitutional validity accorded other legislation.”).  This presumption of 
validity applies to the Court’s consideration of how the government applies and enforces 
an ordinance, not just in evaluating its legality based on its face.  M&S Cox Investments, 
LLC v. Provo, 2007 UT App 315, 169 P.3d 789, illustrates this point.  There, the plaintiff 
challenged an ordinance requiring owners to occupy homes in a particular zoning district 
before they could rent auxiliary units on the same property.  Id., ¶ 4.  The ordinance 
                                                 
3  Given the City’s clear legal authority to regulate streets by requiring users to pay 
for parking, the Plaintiffs’ reliance on the dicta in El Rancho Enterprises, Inc. v. Murray 
City Corp., 565 P.2d 778, 779-80 (1977) is misplaced and overstated.  (See Appellant 
Brief at 26.)  The court in El Rancho did not rule on the plaintiffs’ claims for a refund for 
overcharges.  It just remanded the case.  Id. at 780.  The dicta in El Rancho that the 
Plaintiffs cite has never been cited by a Utah appellate court to allow a user of 
government services to obtain a refund based on changes in technology that are not 
precisely and immediately incorporated into the applicable law.  Instead, El Rancho 
stands only for the proposition that plaintiffs do not have to file notices of claim against 
the government when suing in equity.  Id. at 779-80. 
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provided for an amortization period for affected properties to come into compliance, 
which included a formula for calculated the time period to recover the value by “dividing 
the residential value of the property by the average monthly net rental income for the 
property.”  Id., ¶ 5 (internal citations omitted).  Cox applied the phrase, “average monthly 
net rental income” literally to claim that his property’s income had a negative value so 
the amortization period was indefinite.  Id., ¶ 7.  The City interpreted “average monthly 
net rental income” as the fair market rental value of the property so it excluded from the 
equation years when the property was under construction and making no income.  Id., ¶ 
10.  Cox challenged the City’s interpretation, claiming that it illegally interpreted the 
ordinance by ignoring its literal language.  Id., ¶ 31.  The Court rejected Cox’s overly 
formalistic, literal view of the ordinance and accepted the City’s interpretation, which 
was consistent with the ordinance’s purpose and its enabling statute.  Id., ¶¶ 32-25.  The 
Court held that “when interpreting an ordinance, it is axiomatic that this court’s primary 
goal is to give effect to the [city]’s intent in light of the purpose that the [ordinance] was 
meant to achieve.” Id. ¶ 30 (internal quotations omitted).  
The Plaintiffs’ argument here is similar to that of Cox.  By advancing a formalistic 
interpretation of the phase, “parking meter”, they argue that the City cannot legally 
enforce the Operative Ordinances against them and thus that they can act in contravention 
of the ordinance’s purposes with impunity.  In short, the Plaintiffs are asking for an 
interpretation that leads to a finding of illegally rather than a finding consistent with the 
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ordinances’ purpose.  The Court should reject that argument, as it did in M&S Cox 
Investments.  Instead, the Court should evaluate the enforcement of the Operative 
Ordinances “in their entirety, in light of [their] objective, and . . . harmonize [their] 
provisions in accordance with [their] intent and purpose.”  Id., ¶ 31 (internal citations 
omitted). 
1. The Operative Ordinances Were Broad Enough to Allow for the 
2012 Update in Technology from Coin-Operated Meters to 
Parking Pay Stations.  
 
The Operative Ordinances under which the City enforced parking from 2012 to 
2014 were broad enough to allow for the technology update to parking pay stations.   
A parking meter is defined as “any mechanical device installed within or upon the 
curb or sidewalk area immediately contiguous to a parking meter space which, when the 
mechanisms thereof is set in motion, indicates unexpired parking time for the adjacent 
parking vehicle.”  Salt Lake City Ordinance § 12.56.140.  A parking meter space is 
defined as an “area adjacent to the parking meter upon any street.”  Id.  
Parking pay stations are “mechanical device[s] installed within or upon the curb or 
sidewalk.”  They operate in conjunction with numbered sign posts installed “immediately 
contiguous” to the parking space.  Parking pay stations have “mechanisms” that when 
“set in motion” generate a parking receipt that “indicates unexpired parking time” for the 
vehicle in a specific numbered spot by showing when the allotted time ends.  Id. 
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The Plaintiffs focus on the fact that the parking pay stations are not “contiguous” 
or directly next to the parking spaces, but they overemphasize the importance of this 
word and ignore its larger context.  (Appellant Brief at 29-30.)  Because the ordinances 
use “contiguous” and “adjacent” interchangeably to describe the same physical 
relationship, the implication is that literal continuity is not required, just close proximity.  
See Salt Lake City Ordinance § 12.56.140 (definitions of “parking meter” and “parking 
meter space”) (A); id. at 12.56.150(B) (“parking meter contiguous”); id. at 12.56.190(A) 
(“parking meter space adjacent to the meter”).  “Continuous” means “touching along a 
boundary or at a point.”  “Contiguous.” Merriam-Webster.com. Merriam-Webster, n.d. 
Web. 7 Feb. 2016. “Adjacent” has the additional meaning of “close or near.”  “Adjacent.” 
Merriam-Webster.com. Merriam-Webster, n.d. Web. 7 Feb. 2016.  When a word has two 
possible meanings it is not necessarily ambiguous; instead, the Court should consider the 
word in the context of the entire law and ascribe a meaning that “produces a substantive 
effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.”  United Sav. Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers 
of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 630 (1988).  When one considers the 
interplay between the signposts and the parking pay stations, the City’s new enforcement 
system has “mechanical devises” “indicating unexpired time” adjacent to parking spaces.  
The parking pay station system falls within the definition of “parking meter.”   
Having considered the underlying definitions, we turn to the Operative 
Ordinances.  Salt Lake City Ordinance § 12.56.150(A) requires the City to install a 
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mechanical device to allow for parking enforcement.  It provides that the City “shall” 
install parking meters “contiguous to each parking meter space” so that the deposit of 
coins shall “permit the mechanism [of the meter] to be set in motion, so that the meter 
will show the unexpired parking time applicable to the parking meter space . . .”  When 
the time has expired, the meter is in violation.  Salt Lake City Ordinance § 
12.56.150(A).4   
Subsection (B) and (C) of § 12.56.150 describe how a user could violate the 
ordinance.  Subsection (B) states that “no person shall park any vehicle in any parking 
meter space . . . without immediately depositing in the parking meter contiguous to the 
space such lawful coin or coins . . . as are required for such meter and designed by 
directions on the meter, and when required by the direction of the meter, setting in 
                                                 
4   The installation provision in subsection 12.56.150(A) is the only “shall” language 
that applies to a governmental actor in the Operative Ordinances.  Subsection 
12.56.150(A) states that the City’s Transportation Engineer “shall” install a system for 
allow for the fair enforcement of parking ordinances through the installation of parking 
meters. The “shall” language allows the other provisions of the ordinance to become 
operative, but the Plaintiffs’ overemphasize the phrase to argue that strict compliance 
with the ordinance requires coin-operated meters.  See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt 
Lake County, 575 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1978) (“If the act is performed but not in the time 
or in the precise manner directed by the statute, the provision will not be considered 
mandatory if the purpose of the statute has been substantially complied with and no 
substantial rights have been jeopardized.”)  “Shall” appears in other sections of the 
Operative Ordinances, but only to prohibit users from parking without paying or parking 
longer than allowed.  These provisions certainly do not show that the intent of the City 
Council was to impose an additional duty on the City Transportation Engineer.  Board of 
Educ. of Granite School Dist., 659 P.2d 1030, 1033-35 (1983) (holding that a statute 
should be considered mandatory if “from consideration of the whole statute and its nature 
or object it appears that the intent of the legislature was to impose a duty on a public 
officer rather than a discretionary power”).  
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operation the timing mechanism thereof in accordance with said directions.”  Id. § 12-56-
150(B).  Notably, this subsection allows for flexibility in the type of payment accepted by 
the meter and in how to set the timing mechanism of the meter into motion.  The 
ordinance critically requires a user to follow what is “required for such meter and 
designated by directions on the meter,” implying that the City could update those 
directions.  Id.  Subsection (C) provides that “no person . . . shall permit any vehicle . . . 
to remain parked in a parking meter space . . . beyond the time limited for parking as 
designated by the meter.”  As with subsection (B), subsection (C)’s critical requirement is 
that the user follow the time limits designated on the meter itself.   
Salt Lake City’s “expired meter” ordinance, 12.56.190(A), states that “no person 
shall park or permit any vehicle to remain parked in any parking meter space adjacent to 
the meter for a continuous period longer than that designated on the meter, or at any time 
when the meter violation indicator is shown.”  In light of the disjunctive, “or,” 
individuals could violate this ordinance by parking in a paid space longer than the two 
hour time limit on the meter, even if the meter had no physical indication that it was in 
violation.  Id.  Subsection (B) prohibits feeding money into the meter in order to park 
longer than the designated time limit.  Id. at 12.56.190(B).   
As the above analysis shows, users could violate the Operative Ordinances using 
the parking pay station system just as easily as a coin-operated meter.  Users could 
disregard the signs on the sign posts and the parking pay stations and park without 
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“immediately depositing” money, using either coins, a credit card, of Smart phone 
payment.  They could leave their car in a paid spot longer than two hours, disregarding 
the “time limited for parking as designated by the meter,” in contravention of 
12.56.150(C).  Users could leave their car in a meter spot in excess of the time they have 
paid for, in violation of 12.56.190.  Given the language of the Operative Ordinances and 
the operation of the parking pay station system, the City acted legally in issuing the 
Plaintiffs parking tickets for “expired meter” and “overtime parking” between 2012 and 
2014.   
2.   Alternatively, the Operative Ordinances Only Require 
Substantial Compliance with Their Terms.  
 
It is the City’s view that the operative ordinances are broad enough to allow 
enforcement using the updated technology of the parking pay stations.  However, even if 
the City did not strictly comply with the entirety of the Operative Ordinances, only 
substantial compliance is required, as the district court held.   
“Substantial compliance with a statutory provision is adequate when the provision 
is directory, meaning it goes ‘merely to the proper, orderly and prompt conduct of . . . 
business . . . and the policy behind the statute has been realized.’”  Aaron and Morey 
Bonds and Bail v. Third Dist. Court, 2007 UT 24, ¶ 7, 156 P.3d 801.  “There is no 
universal rule of statutory construction to distinguish between statutes requiring strict or 
substantial compliance.”  Id., ¶ 12.  The primary guiding principal is that the “intention of 
the legislature . . . should be controlling and no formalistic rule of grammar or word form 
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should stand in the way of carrying out legislative intent.”  Board of Educ. of Granite 
School Dist., 659 P.2d at 1033-34 (quoting Kennecott Copper Corp., 575 P.2d at 706).  
The Court should also consider whether “failure to obey” a particular provision will 
prejudice the rights of those “protected by the statute.”  Id.5   
The Plaintiffs claim that the point of departure between the updated technology 
and the Operative Ordinances is the definition of “parking meter.”  They argue that the 
City “removed all parking meters” in 2012 and thus “under no circumstances could a 
class member be liable to pay for parking” or be found in violation of the Operative 
Ordinances.  (R. 60.)  As stated above, the parking pay stations fit within the ordinance’s 
definition of meter.6  The technical definition of “parking meter” also helps illuminate the 
purpose of the Operative Ordinances:  to notify users of the requirement to pay for 
parking in certain designated spaces and to provide a mechanism whereby both the user 
and the enforcement personnel are informed of when the car has been parked without 
payment or longer than allowed.  Even if the Court determines that the City’s parking pay 
                                                 
5  The Plaintiffs argue that the Court cannot apply the substantial compliance 
doctrine to the Operative Ordinances because they are not ambiguous.  Appellant Brief at 
27.  Strict compliance versus substantial compliance is a question of whether individuals 
have to follow the law exactly or whether some statutory requirements are merely 
directory, like the inclusion of fax numbers on a notice as was the case in Aaron and 
Morey, 2007 UT 24, ¶ 7.  There was nothing ambiguous about a fax number requirement, 
but the Utah Supreme Court still found that only substantial compliance was required 
because inclusion of the fax number was not necessary to realize the policy behind the 
statute and no party was prejudiced by its exclusion.  Id., ¶¶ 1, 10, 11, 28.   
6  Parking meter is defined as “any mechanical device installed within or upon the 
curb or sidewalk area immediately contiguous to the parking meter space which, when 
the mechanism thereof is set in motion indicates unexpired parking time for the adjacent 
parking vehicle.”  Salt Lake City Code § 12-56-140 
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station system does not squarely fit within the parking meter definition, the updated 
technology still serves the purpose of the Operative Ordinances and does not prejudice 
the Plaintiffs.  Consequently, substantial compliance is allowed.   
Allowing substantial compliance is consistent with the entire ordinance section 
regulating parking.  The parking enforcement ordinances contemplate updates to the 
parking system announced with signs.  Section 12.56.010 admonishes users to pay 
attention to parking requirements “as indicated on official signs.”  Section 12.56.020 tells 
users that they have a duty to “observe other and more restrictive provisions prohibiting 
or limiting the . . . parking of vehicles in specific places or at specific times.”  Id., § 
12.56.020.  Conversely, the City is required to provide signs notifying users about 
parking limitations.  Id., § 12.56.060.  The implication is that the City Council’s intent 
was not just to install coin-operated parking meters, but to allow for some changes to the 
regulation of streets and paid parking as long as there is notice.  The implication is also 
that users could violate restrictions on parking if they disregard parking signs, or in this 
instance, instructions on parking pay stations.   
Finally, there is no prejudice to the rights of those “protected by the [ordinance]” 
if the Court were to find that only substantial compliance is required.  Board of Educ. of 
Granite School Dist., 659 P.2d at 1033-34.  The Plaintiffs argue that substantial 
compliance would prejudice them because they would have to pay to park in pay-for-
parking spaces.  (Appellant Brief at 32 (indicating that substantial compliance is the 
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difference “between a duty to pay and adequate grounds to impose a civil penalty or 
not”).)  Voluntarily paying for a benefit— the ability to park in certain premium 
downtown spots — is not a prejudice to the “rights” the Operative Ordinances were 
designed to protect.  The Operative Ordinances do not provide a “right” to use coin-
operated parking meters only or a “right” to park for free.   
None of the plaintiffs allege that they were prejudiced by the function of the new 
parking pay station technology, which makes this case distinguishable from Smith v. City 
of New Orleans ex rel. Shires, 71 So.3d 525 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2011). 7  The Smith court 
held that the new parking ordinance should not apply retroactively because citizens were 
not on notice that New Orleans was issuing citations based on payment to the Parkeon 
stations.  Smith, 71 So. 3d at 531.  This was particularly troubling to the Court because in 
some areas the Parkeon stations and the old meters were simultaneously operational.  Id. 
at 531.  Here, the Plaintiffs are not complaining that they were uninformed about the new 
pay stations or how to operate them.  Their argument is rooted solely in a painstakingly 
strict reading of the Operative Ordinances and there is simply no prejudice with 
substantial compliance.  Aaron and Morey, 2007 UT 24, ¶ 15 (holding that prejudice 
                                                 
7  The Plaintiffs overstate the legal applicability of Smith as well.  (See Appellant 
Brief at 32-33.)  In Smith, New Orleans argued that a new ordinance should be applied 
retroactively.  The analysis required to determine whether an ordinance should be applied 
retroactively is distinct from the analysis required to determine if a City’s enforcement 
policies substantially comply with an existing ordinance.  Compare Salt Lake City Corp. 
v. Haik, 2014 UT App 193, ¶ 24, 334 P.3d 490 (articulating the analysis for substantial 
compliance) with Roark v. Crabtree, 893 P.2d 1058, 1061-62 (Utah 1995) (articulating 
the analysis for the retroactive application of the law).   
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should not be evaluated hypothetically and only prejudice that “actually did occur” 
should impact the analysis).   
At a minimum, the new parking system substantially complies with the Operative 
Ordinances.  The Court should uphold the district court’s decision that it was legal for the 
City to collect parking revenue and enforce violations of the Operative Ordinances 
between 2012 and 2014.   
3. The Plaintiffs’ Claim that Equitable Estoppel Prevents the City 
from Arguing that the Operative Ordinances were Enforceable 
is Unavailing.   
 
The Plaintiffs argue that under the doctrine of equitable estoppel the City cannot 
claim that it legally issued the Plaintiffs’ parking notices under the Operative Ordinances 
because of the existence of a draft ordinance that was never passed into law.  (Appellant 
Brief at 35.)  This argument fails for several reasons.  
As a general rule, equitable estoppel cannot be “invoked against a governmental 
entity.”  Anderson v. Public Service Com’n of Utah, 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992).  It is 
only assertible against a governmental entity when “failing to apply the rule would result 
in manifest injustice.”  Holland v. Career Serv. Review Bd., 856 P.2d 678, 682 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993).  Equitable estoppel requires the following elements: “(1) a statement, 
admission, act or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2) 
reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken on the basis of the first party’s 
statement, admission, act or failure to act; and (3) injury to the second party that would 
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result from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, 
act, or failure to act.”  Benson v. Peace Officers Standards and Training Council, 2011 
UT App 220, ¶ 13, 261 P.3d 643.   
The circumstances here do not meet any of the required elements, let alone 
constitute “manifest injustice.”  First, a 2012 cover letter from the director of the 
Department of Community and Economic Development to the City Council, transmitting 
a proposed ordinance that was never adopted, is not attributable to the City as a reliable 
“statement,” particularly when compared to operative ordinances.  Cf. Anderson, 839 
P.2d at 827-828.  (R. 46.)  Second, plaintiffs do not make a cogent reliance argument.  
(Appellant Brief at 36.)  Nonetheless, “reliance” on legislation that was never passed is 
unreasonable.  Third, the Plaintiffs have not suffered an injury that amounts to a 
“manifest injustice.”  It appears that the Plaintiffs’ injury is the City’s legal position that 
the Plaintiffs put too much emphasis on the 2012 cover letter when drafting their 
complaint, instead of considering the ordinances under which they received parking 
notices.  (Appellant Brief at 36.)8 
                                                 
8   The City’s passage of new ordinances in 2014 is inadmissible.  (Appellant Brief at 
8.)  Under Rule 407, subsequent revisions to the Operative Ordinances are inadmissible 
to prove that the City’s enforcement of the Operative Ordinances was somehow 
inequitable.  Utah R. Evid. 407.  Ironically, the Plaintiffs’ complaint forced the City to 
amend its ordinance, arguing that the proposed class would only close when the 
ordinance was updated to precisely reflect the City’s new technology.  (See R. 20, 55.)  
Thus, on one hand, the Plaintiffs demanded a revision to the code and, on the other hand, 
cried foul when that revision was made.  (R. 170.)  Rule 407 was designed to protect 
defendants from these types of litigation tactics in favor of allowing improvements that 
are not admissible to show culpable conduct.  See Luera v. Snyder, 599 F. Supp. 1459, 
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Turning back to the Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim, there is nothing inherently 
inequitable in allowing the City to require users to pay for parking, issue civil penalties 
for parking violations, and keep its parking revenue.  If the Plaintiffs were to prevail on 
their unjust enrichment claim, they would receive the benefit of two years of free parking 
in pay-for-parking spaces just because the City updated its technology.  In other words, it 
would be the Plaintiffs that would receive something for nothing.  Richards v. Brown, 
2009 UT App 315, ¶ 30, 222 P.3d 69.  Their unjust enrichment claim fails.  
B. The Plaintiffs Never Pursued a Legal Remedy so They Cannot Proceed 
in Equity.  
 
The Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim also fails because they had a legal remedy 
that they did not seek.  “Unjust enrichment is designed to provide an equitable remedy 
[only] where one does not exist at law.”  Lysenko v. Sawaya, 199 UT App 31, ¶ 13, 973 
P.3d 443.  This is because “equitable remedies are secondary gap-fillers. They are aimed 
at deficiencies left after exhaustion of primary legal claims.”  VCS, Inc. v. Utah 
Community Bank, 2012 UT 89, ¶ 41, 293 P.3d 290.  The Plaintiffs here had a legal 
remedy that they failed to exercise, except in one successful instance: namely, 
challenging the parking notices they received through contacting a hearing officer or 
seeking a hearing in small claims court.  
                                                                                                                                                             
1463 (D. Colo. 1984) (refusing to allow testimony of police department policy changes 
after the incident in question because if it were allowed “remedial measures which are to 
the benefit of the public at large might be foregone by defendants afraid of the prejudicial 
effect such evidence would have in lawsuits”).   
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The Plaintiffs do not address this argument directly.  Instead, they argue that the 
City acted “arbitrarily and capriciously” by purportedly failing to follow Salt Lake City 
Code sections 2.75.020 and 2.75.030 regarding the timeline to appeal and the location 
and supervision of hearing officers.  (Appellant Brief at 33-35.)  These arguments mirror 
those made in response to the district court’s ruling that the Plaintiffs’ waived their 
claims and that the City’s process was constitutional.  (R. 512; Appellant Brief at 16-18.)  
The City addresses these arguments in the due process section below.  (See infra at 43-
47.) 
II. THE PLAINTIFFS CANNOT RECOVER IN EQUITY BECAUSE THEY 
VOLUNTARILY PAID THEIR PARKING NOTICES.   
 
The Plaintiffs cannot recover in equity because of the voluntary payment doctrine.  
Utah recognizes the well-settled rule that “a person cannot recover back money which he 
has voluntarily paid with full knowledge of the facts, without fraud, duress, or extortion 
in some form.”  Southern Title Guar. Co. v. Bethers, 761 P.2d 951, 955 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988).   
The Plaintiffs make two unavailing arguments that voluntary payment does not 
apply.  First, they argue that the district court erred because plaintiffs do not have to 
anticipate affirmative defenses.  (See Appellant Brief at 13.)  Second, and somewhat 
inconsistently, they allege that they did plead duress, mistake and fraud in response to the 
affirmative defense of voluntary payment.  (See Appellant Brief at 21-25.)   
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A.   The Court Can Rule on the Voluntary Payment Doctrine at the Motion 
to Dismiss Level Because Fraud and Mistake Were Not Pled as 
Required Under Rule 9(b). 
 
As to the first argument, Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures requires 
that “all averments of fraud and mistake” be “stated with particularity.”  The Plaintiffs 
certainly cannot evade the special pleading requirements of Rule 9 by claiming they do 
not have to anticipate affirmative defenses.  Any allegations of fraud and mistake of fact 
needed to be in the complaint, but they are not.  (R. 38-41).  Notably, the Plaintiffs cite 
possible legal defenses to the voluntary payment of their tickets but do not allege that 
additional factual development is necessary to support that position.  Counsel’s 
painstaking deconstruction of each of the City’s documents now is not a substitute for 
actually pleading with particularity that the Plaintiffs were defrauded by the City or 
mistaken about a material fact at the time they paid each ticket.  Because there is no 
averment of fraud or mistake in the Amended Complaint, and because the Plaintiffs do 
not argue that additional factual development is required to support that position, the 
Court can decide this issue on a motion to dismiss.  
B.  The Plaintiffs’ Allegations of Fraud, Mistake, and Duress Fail as a 
Matter of Law.  
 
The Plaintiffs’ second, somewhat inconsistent argument, is that they actually plead 
fraud, mistake, and duress.  As argued, the Plaintiffs are really alleging mistakes of law, 
which are not a recognized basis for a refund of a voluntary payment.  The Plaintiffs 
argue that their payment was not voluntary because the Operative Ordinances were 
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unenforceable and the City’s two-tiered hearing process purportedly had no basis in the 
applicable ordinances.  (Appellant Brief at 23-25.)9  They claim that the City’s notices 
misled them about the validity of its process, so their payment could not have been 
voluntary.  (Id.)  In other words, they are asserting mistakes of law.  Desert Nat. Bank v. 
Burton, 53 P. 215, 220 (Utah 1898) (“A mistake of law is an erroneous conclusion as to 
the legal effect of known facts”).  An allegation of mistake of law is not an exception to 
the voluntary payment doctrine.  See 17 McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 49.69 (3d. ed.); see also 
Smith v. City of St. Louis, 409 S.W. 3d 404, 419-420 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2013) (holding 
that motorists’ voluntary payment of a traffic violation precluded the motorist from 
receiving a refund of that payment even after the ordinance was found invalid as applied); 
see Southern Title Guar. Co., 761 P.2d at 955 (holding that the plaintiff was not entitled 
to a refund even though it was mistaken about the legal status of the property for which it 
paid because “without reserving any rights, making any protest, or even investigating the 
situation further, [it] voluntarily send its check” and received the property); Homeside 
Lending, Inc. v. Miller, 2001 UT App 247, ¶ 22, 31 P.3d 607 (“equity will not correct a 
mistake of law as to the legal effects of an agreement unconnected to a mistake of fact, or 
fraud, or imposition, or undue advantage” (internal citations omitted)).    
The Plaintiffs’ claims of duress, fraud, and mistake also fail to meet the necessary 
elements.  Duress only exists “when a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by an 
                                                 
9  Ironically, Bivens alleges that he did not “believe the expired meter and overtime 
parking ordinances were legally enforceable against him” yet paid them anyway.  (R. 38.)  
As pled, that is certainly a voluntary and knowing payment. 
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improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative” other 
than making the payment.  Boud v. SDNCO, Inc., 2002 UT 83, ¶ 23, 54, P.3d 1131; 
Ellison v. Pingree, 231 P. 827, 831 (Utah 1924).  The immediate and obvious relief from 
voluntary payment was initiating a hearing process.  Plaintiffs’ examples of payments 
made under “duress” involve threats to deprive individuals of “necessities.”  (Appellant 
Brief at 21-22.)  Legitimate warnings about increased costs or immobilization of a car for 
failing to pay outstanding parking tickets are not the equivalent of threats to restrict 
access to fundamental services like water.10  Likewise, a “threat to bring an action to 
enforce a lawful demand” does not constitute duress.  Avco Financial Services v. 
Johnson, 596 P.2d 658, 660 (Utah 1979) (internal citations omitted) .  Even taking the 
Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, the actions of the City do not constitute “improper threats.”   
                                                 
10  The City can immobilize vehicles when two or more outstanding parking notices 
are associated with the vehicle.  Salt Lake City Code, § 12.96.020.A.  Cars are 
immobilized for a variety of parking violations, not just for violating the Operative 
Ordinances.  See e.g., Salt Lake City Code, § 12.56.550; id., § 12.56.040 (stating that cars 
are required to have two valid license plates); id., § 12.56.110 (stating that drivers are 
required to comply with angle or parallel parking signage).  Thus, the warning on the 
parking notice, “Vehicles with TWO or more outstanding Parking Notices may be 
IMMOBILIZED or IMPOUNDED,” is not a threat but a possible consequence for failing 
to deal with a parking notice.  The enforcement officer does not know if the parking 
notice recipient has previously parking in a disability parking space, for instance, so the 
warning is appropriately cautionary.   
The City is entitled to pursue a collection action if a parking notice is not paid or 
contested within forty days.  See Salt Lake City Code § 12.56.570.H; id., § 2.75.030.E.  
Thus, the warnings on the parking notice that “[f]ailure to pay the penalty may result in 
the filing of a SMALL CLAIMS COURT ACTION and increased penalties” are possible 
legal consequences for an unresolved civil violation.   
Finally, the increase in the fee for failing to promptly pay is found in Salt Lake 
City Code § 12.56.550.  
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Likewise, there is also no allegation of fraud.  General allegations that a defendant 
has provided inadequate information are insufficient to show fraud.  See Shah v. 
Intermountain  Healthcare, Inc., 2013 UT App 261, ¶¶ 10-12, 314 P.3d 1079 .  Even if 
certain inconsistencies between the City’s code and the City’s process existed, they did 
not amount to fraudulent misrepresentations.  The Plaintiffs do not allege that these 
inconsistencies induced them to voluntarily pay their parking tickets but that they would 
not have done so otherwise.  See Armed Forces Ins. Exchange v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, 
¶ 16, 70 P.3d 35 (stating that fraud requires that a misrepresentation that induced the 
plaintiff to act reasonably and in ignorance of the statement’s falsity).  In fact, the 
Plaintiffs seem to allege the opposite.  Bivens thought the Operative Ordinances were 
unenforceable but paid them anyway, despite having prevailed once in small claims 
court.  (R. 38-39.)  Reed claims that she received her ticket in error, but paid the fine 
anyway.  (R. 40-41.)  Arias makes no representations about fraud or mistake.  (R. 39-40.)   
Finally, the Plaintiffs cannot establish a mistake of fact.  The City did not conceal 
any of the facts that the plaintiffs now claim led to their “mistaken” payments.  See 
Southern Title Guar. Co., Inc., 761 P.2d at 956, n.2 (Utah App. Ct. 1988) (stating that 
relief from a unilateral mistake is only offered when the mistake occurred 
“notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary diligence by the party making the mistake”) 
(internal citations omitted)).  The parking notice itself directed recipients to talk with a 
hearing officer in the City’s Civil Enforcement division, rather than in Justice Court.  (R. 
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110.)  The parking notice also lists the code section violated.  (R. 126.)  The plaintiffs 
could have easily looked up the ordinance and determined that it had not been updated to 
reflect the technological upgrade to the pay station system.  The Plaintiffs’ lack of 
diligence before voluntarily paying their parking notice does not amount to a 
misrepresentation by the City.   
In sum, the Plaintiffs voluntary payment of their notices is fatal to their unjust 
enrichment claim and none of the recognized exceptions to that doctrine apply.   
III. THE PLAINTIFFS WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO BRING THEIR CLAIMS 
BECAUSE THEY FAILED TO TAKE ANY STEPS TO CONTEST THEIR 
PARKING TICKETS. 
 
The Court should also affirm the district court’s finding that the Plaintiffs waived 
their right to “challenge the constitutionality or enforceability” of the parking notices by 
“voluntarily paying them without challenge.”  (R. 512.)  Waiver occurs “when the totality 
of the circumstances indicates an intentional abandonment or relinquishment of a known 
constitutional right.”  Barnard v. Wasserman, 855 P.2d 243, 247 (Utah 1993).  Utah 
courts have held that when a plaintiff has voluntarily paid fines assessed by the 
government, that plaintiff cannot raise a challenge to the constitutionality of the process 
under which the fines were assessed.  Bentley v. West Valley City, 2001 UT 23, ¶ 3, 21 
P.3d 210 (holding that plaintiffs could not contest the constitutionality of their speeding 
tickets in a collateral proceeding because they had plead guilty and paid the associated 
fines); see also Weinrauch v. Park City, 751 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that 
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because the plaintiff “ignored the available procedures, she is in no position to argue that 
they are unconstitutional”).  The Plaintiffs make three arguments in challenging the 
district court’s waiver analysis:  first, that waiver cannot be decided on a motion to 
dismiss; second, that utilizing the City’s process would have been futile; and third, that 
they were misinformed about the hearing process.  (Appellant Brief at 13-18.) 
First, although waiver and voluntary payment are affirmative defenses, the Court 
can consider them on a motion to dismiss when the elements of the defense are alleged in 
the complaint.  Zoumadakis v. Uintah Basin Medical Center, 2005 UT App 325, ¶ 6, 122 
P.2d 891.  Since the Plaintiffs are bringing a due process claim, the “right” the City 
alleges they waived by paying each parking notice was the right to be heard.  Cleveland 
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985).  Since each Plaintiff failed to 
pursue a hearing after being informed of that option, they waived their right to challenge 
the City’s process.  The right to a hearing is clear from the Notice each Plaintiff received.   
The Plaintiffs include a long list of “facts,” that purportedly needed to be in the 
Amended Complaint in order for the Court to find that they voluntarily relinquish their 
due process rights.  (Appellant Brief at 13-14.)  They allege that the Amended Complaint 
needs to show that the Plaintiffs’ knew about each of the purported mistakes in the 
Parking Notice and in the hearing process generally. This argument misstates the waiver 
analysis because it does not focus on the “known constitutional right” the City claims is 
waived. 
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Sapir v. City of Chicago, 749 F. Supp. 187 (N.D. Ill. 1990), illustrates the point.  
There, the court dismissed a similar challenge to Chicago’s parking enforcement system 
because the plaintiffs had paid their fines.  A plaintiff alleged that his due process rights 
were violated because Chicago purportedly demanded that he pay all parking fines and 
penalties before they would issue him a liquor license.  Id. at 190.  He argued that he only 
paid his parking tickets after being coerced by the city.  In granting Chicago’s motion to 
dismiss, the court held that “[b]y paying his ticket, fines and penalties, [the plaintiff] 
deprived the City of the opportunity to provide him with due process, and he thereby 
waived his right to test the constitutionality of the City’s enforcement procedures.”  Id. at 
190-91.  Similarly, the Plaintiffs here could have availed themselves of the hearing 
process and avoided any property deprivation had they won.  The Plaintiffs cannot forego 
that challenge just to pursue it collaterally here.  
The Plaintiffs futility argument does not apply here.  All of the cases cited by the 
district court found waiver in the face of challenges to either the constitutionality of the 
process or the enforceability of the underlying ordinances.  See Barnard v. Wassermann, 
855 P.2d at 247 (holding that by declining the “offer of a hearing at which this matter 
might have been resolved . . . he voluntarily relinquished the pre-deprivation process 
offered to him” even though Barnard alleged that the process would be unfair); Pitts v. 
Board of Education, 869 F.2d 555, 556 (10th Cir. 1989) (affirming the district court’s 
holding that the plaintiff had waived his “due process rights by refusing to take advantage 
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of the numerous procedural rights he was afforded under Kansas law”); Weinrauch v. 
Park City, 751 F.2d at 360 (holding that because the plaintiff “ignored the available 
procedures, she was in no position to argue that they are unconstitutional”); Herrada v. 
City of Detroit, 275 F.3d 553, 558 (6th Cir. 2001) (only evaluating the constitutionality of 
the notice because she voluntarily paid her parking ticket).  The argument that availing 
themselves of the process would have been futile is inapposite, given that they were 
challenging the constitutionality of that process itself.  The policy threat tying together 
these cases is that a collateral court should not evaluate a process in the abstract, when a 
plaintiff failed to use that same process to potentially avoid the property deprivation in 
the first place. 
Moreover, when read together, the City’s ordinances explicitly state that ticket 
recipients need to see a hearing officer before proceeding before a judge.  See § 
2.75.030(C) (providing that “any person receiving a civil citation who requests a hearing 
shall discuss the matter with a hearing officer for informal resolution prior to the hearing 
before the justice court”); see also § 12.56.570 (“Any person having received notice of 
such unauthorized use, or the owner of any vehicle employed in such use, may appear 
before a hearing officer and present and contest such alleged unauthorized use.”).  The 
City reads these two provisions together as requiring a parking notice recipient to avail 
themselves of the first step of the City’s process.  (R. 110 (stating that you “must see a 
hearing officer in person” to discuss your ticket).)  When a legislative body states that a 
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specific administrative process must be followed before a plaintiff can proceed to court, 
the Court’s “enforce it strictly.”  Salt Lake City Mission v. Salt Lake City¸2008 UT 31, ¶ 
6, 184 P.3d 599.  In all but one instance, the Plaintiffs failed to avail themselves of this 
first step.  (R. 38-40.)  Although the City concedes that hearing officers’ discretion to 
dismiss or reduce parking fees has limits, it is still the first step before proceeding before 
a small claims court judge at the justice court.  The Plaintiffs’ futility argument is belied 
by the fact that Bivens utilized the Small Claims Court process to get his parking ticket 
dismissed, suffering no property deprivation.  (R. 39.)   
Third, the Plaintiffs argue that the City misinformed them about the process for 
challenging their parking tickets and consequently they could not waive their due process 
rights.  (Appellant Brief at 19-21.)  Of course, if the misinformation was that no process 
existed, then the Plaintiffs could not knowingly waive their due process challenge.  That 
is not the situation here.  The misinformation on the Parking Notice was that they could 
request a hearing within twenty days rather than ten.  (R. 110.)  See also Salt Lake City 
Code § 2.75.030.  In that sense, the misinformation exaggerated the consequences of 
failing to act, but did not mislead the recipients about the existence of a process.  Because 
the City has some pre-deprivation process where the Plaintiffs could have resolved their 
tickets, they had an obligation to pursue that process before resorting to a collateral 
attack.  Because the Plaintiffs waived their right to challenge the City’s process by not 
contacting a hearing officer, the Court can end its due process analysis here.   
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IV.   THE PLAINTIFFS’ DUE PROCESS CLAIM FAILS AS A MATTER OF 
LAW.  
 
 The City did not violate the Plaintiffs’ rights to procedural due process, even 
assuming the errors alleged in the complaint are true.  In order to maintain a due process 
action, a plaintiff must first establish that he or she has been “deprived of a protected 
interest in property or liberty.”  Salt Lake City Corp. v. Jordan River Restoration 
Network, 2012 UT 84, ¶ 48, 299 P.3d 990.  Once a protected interest is established, 
constitutional due process requires “adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a 
meaningful manner.”  Id., ¶ 110.  The property interest at stake is the $15-$55 dollars the 
Plaintiffs voluntarily paid after receiving the Parking Notice.  Notably, none of the 
Defendants were deprived of any property interest after petitioning for dismissal from a 
hearing officer or after availing themselves of the Small Claims Court process.  
Consequently, the Court should focus on whether the City provided “adequate notice.”  
The Plaintiffs first argue that the District Court erred by failing to analyze their 
claims under Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution.  (Appellant Brief at 37-42.)  
The City acknowledges the unique nature of Utah’s constitution, but the Plaintiffs have 
not put forward a procedural due process analysis distinct from that found in federal court 
precedent.  Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983), one of two cases on which 
the Plaintiffs rely, follows and cites Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 
U.S. 306, 314 (1950),  as articulating the “classic requirements of adequate notice.”  
Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1211-12.  Likewise, in In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 877 (Utah 
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1996), the Court held that “Utah’s constitutional guarantee of due process is substantially 
the same as the due process guarantees contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments 
to the United State Constitution.”  Id. at 877.  Given the similarities between state and 
federal law specifically with respect to procedural due process claims, the district court 
did not err. 
The Court should evaluate the property interest at stake when determining the type 
of notice that is constitutionally adequate.  “[D]ue process’s ‘flexibility is in its scope 
once it has been determined that some process is due; it is a recognition that not all 
situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.’”  Jordan 
River Restoration, 2012 UT 84, ¶ 50 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 
(1972)).  Notice typically satisfies due process when it is “‘reasonably calculated, under 
the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford 
them an opportunity to present their objections.’”  Jordan River Restoration Network, 
2012 UT 84, ¶ 53 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314).   
A. The City’s Parking Notice Satisfies the Requirements of Due Process.   
A number of jurisdictions have held that the type of notice provided by the City is 
constitutionally adequate, even assuming misinformation and omissions.  For instance, in 
Rector v. City & County of Denver, 348 F.3d 935, 948 (10th Cir. 2003), the plaintiffs 
claimed that the City’s parking tickets led them to erroneously believe that late fees 
would not be stayed even if they timely challenged the ticket.  Id. at 938.  They also 
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argued that the late fees at issue were not authorized under Denver’s ordinances.  Id. at 
947.  Despite these failings, the Tenth Circuit found that the parking ticket provided 
constitutionally adequate notice.  Denver’s parking notice’s listed a phone number to call 
“for information or to dispute this citation.”  Id.  at 938.  It listed several means of 
payment.  It provided the physical location and hours of the Denver Parking Citations 
Bureau.  Id. at 398, n.1.  Denver’s hearing process was two-tiered, but the ticket did not 
include information about the additional administrative process the recipient would be 
provided if they call the listed number.  Id.  The Court held that even if the 
misinformation about the late fees and their lack of authorization were true, the notice did 
not violate procedural due process protections.  Id. at 947-48.  “Constitutional due 
process requires only that parties be informed in a manner reasonably calculated to 
apprise them of the pending action and provide an opportunity to respond.  Because the 
parking citations clearly indicate that a late fee of a specified amount will be imposed if 
the fine is not paid within twenty days, ticket recipients are advised of both the amount of 
the late fee and the twenty-day response period.”  Id. (internal citations omitted).   
Likewise, the Sixth Circuit also found challenged parking notices constitutionally 
adequate, despite room for improvement and a degree of misinformation.  In Herrada v. 
City of Detroit, 275 F.3d 553, 557 (6th Cir. 2001), the plaintiffs alleged that the parking 
notices were threatening and misleading to such a degree that they did not satisfy the 
notice requirements of due process.  Id. at 556.  The Court found that the threats of 
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possible booting, impoundment, or legal action were legitimate, possible consequences of 
failing to pay or contest a parking ticket.  Id. at 557-58.  Even if that wasn’t the case, 
however, the Court held that “because the citation clearly states how to obtain a hearing, 
and both the citation and the overdue notice include telephone numbers for more 
information, the potential penalties [of failing to respond], even if misleading, do not 
violate procedural due process.”  Id. at 559.   
Similarly, in Horn v. City of Chicago, 860 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1988), the plaintiffs 
asserted that Chicago’s demand notices for payment of overdue parking tickets “failed to 
give sufficient notice that a hearing was available to contest their liability for the amount 
demanded.”  Id. at 700-701.  The demand notices were the third communication the 
recipient received regarding their parking tickets.  Id. at 701.  It threatened default 
judgment as well as the assessment of additional court costs and did not explicitly say 
that the recipient could obtain a hearing.  Id. at 701-02.  The demand notice only 
provided the recipient with a number and address to obtain “additional information.”  Id. 
at 701.  Even though the demand notices did not explicitly notify the recipient of the 
possibility of obtaining a hearing, the Court held that “the demand notices were 
reasonably certain to inform those affected . . . that they could contest the amounts 
demanded.”  Id. (internal citations omitted).  Although flawed, the notice was 
constitutionally adequate.   
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The Parking Notice that each Plaintiff received meets the requirements of due 
process because it notifies the recipient of the violation and affords them an opportunity 
to object.  Jordan River Restoration Network, 2012 UT 84, ¶ 53.  The Parking Notices 
stated the exact ordinance violation, a description of the ordinance, the fine associated 
with the civil violation, the date, time, and location of the violation, a description of the 
offending vehicle, and the issuing officer.  (R. 126.)  It provides multiple ways to pay the 
penalty and notice that the associated fee will increase if a payment is not made within 
ten days.  (R. 110.)  It provides an email address and phone number for “more 
information.”  (Id.)  It contains a separate subheading for “hearings,” and states that “to 
discuss your Parking Notice, you must see the Hearing Officer in person within 10 
calendar days” and then states the availability of hearing officers, including their physical 
location and office hours. (R. 110.)  The other warnings in the Parking Notice are legal, 
possible consequences for failing to pay. (See supra, at n.10.)   
There are a few purported inaccuracies in the Parking Notice that do not rise to a 
constitutional violation because the notice still informs the recipient of the fee and 
provides an opportunity to respond, consistent with the holdings in Rector and Herrada.  
First, recipients have twenty days to request a hearing, not ten.  (See R. 110.)  See Salt 
Lake City Code § 2.75.030(B).  However, this mistake is incorporated into the notice, 
like the purportedly unauthorized late fee in Rector.  348 F.3d at 947-48.  Given its 
inclusion in the notice, the Plaintiffs still had notice of the pending action – the 
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imposition of a $15 parking fee – and an opportunity to respond, albeit in a shorter time 
frame than authorized by ordinance.11  This discrepancy is largely immaterial because 
none of the Plaintiffs allege they tried to talk with a hearing officer outside of the ten day 
window.  
Second, the Plaintiffs contend that the Parking Notice is invalid because it fails to 
inform recipients that the accrual of additional fees is stayed if a hearing is requested.  
(Appellant Brief at 43.)  The Tenth Circuit considered this exact omission in Rector and 
found that the notice still met the requirements of due process because it specified the 
nature of the possible deprivation and informed the recipient that they could respond.  
Rector, 348 F.3d at 938, 948.  The same analysis applies here.12   
1. The Plaintiffs Were Not Deprived of Their Constitutional Rights By 
Being Directed to a Hearing Officer Housed and Supervised Outside 
of the Justice Court.  
 
Finally, the Plaintiffs allege that the Parking Notice is inadequate because it 
requires individuals to appear in person to talk to a hearing officer instead of informing 
them to file a written request for a Justice Court hearing.  (Appellant Brief at 39.)  The 
                                                 
11  Under the City’s ordinance, fees associated with parking tickets are reduced to $15 
if they are paid within 10 days.  See Salt Lake City Ordinance § 12.56.550.  Ticket 
recipients may request a hearing within twenty days, but will not get the highest 
reduction in the penalty if that challenge is filed 11-20 days after the parking notice is 
issued.  See Salt Lake City Ordinance § 2.75.030(B). 
12  The Plaintiffs conflate the Parking Notice and the Small Claims Court Information 
document to create the erroneous impression that all of the Plaintiffs were purposefully 
“mislead” by the City in the same way.  (Compare Appellant’s Brief at 39, 46-47 with R. 
51-52.)   The Court should consider both documents separately particularly since only 
Reed considered any information in the Small Claims Court Information document.  
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Plaintiffs repeat iterations of this argument throughout their brief.  (Id. at 13-14, 16, 23-
24, 52-53)  Their basis for this argument is Salt Lake City ordinance 2.75.030(B) — a 
2006 ordinance dealing with civil violations generally — which states that recipients 
should either pay the civil citation or “file a written request for a hearing before the 
justice court.”  Salt Lake City Ordinance § 2.75.030.   
The City’s requirement that notice recipients talk to a hearing officer is not a 
mistake.  The Plaintiffs ignore a more recent and specific ordinance governing appeals of 
parking notices — namely, Salt Lake City ordinance 12.56.570.  It provides that the 
mayor shall authorize hearing officers to “consider matters related to the unauthorized 
use of streets.”  Id. 12.56.570(A).  Subsection (B) allows any recipient of a parking notice 
to “appear before a hearing officer and present and contest such alleged unauthorized 
use.”  Id. § 12.56.570(B) (emphasis added).  Subsection (C) establishes the burden of 
proof, and subsection (D) provides that the hearing officer may dismiss the ticket if no 
unauthorized use occurred.  Id.  The hearing officer may also dismiss or reduce the ticket 
if the recipient raises a specifically enumerated defense.  Id. at 12.56.570(E), (F).  The 
requirement in the Parking Notice that recipients “appear” in person before hearing 
officers located in the City & County Building is entirely consistent with the provisions 
of section 12.56.570.   
To the extent an inconsistency exists between section 12.56.570 and 2.75.030, the 
Court should attempt to create harmony between the two ordinances, but also give effect 
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to the most recent and more specific provision as the best expression of legislative intent.  
See Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983) (holding that statutes in apparent 
conflict should be construed in harmony when reasonable, but if they cannot be 
reconciled, “the new provision will control as it is the later expression of the 
legislature”); Taghipour v. Jerez, 2002 UT 74, ¶ 11, 52 P.3d 1252 (“our rules of statutory 
construction provide that when two statutory provisions conflict in their operation, the 
provision more specific in application governs over the more general provision” (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted)).  The most recent and more specific provision of 
the code is 12.56.570, which was passed in 2011 and relates specifically to the 
unauthorized use of streets.  As section 12.56.570 clearly provides, the Parking Notices’ 
requirement that recipients appear before hearing officers for the first level of review has 
a legal basis.   
 The Plaintiffs also take issue with the fact that the hearing officers are located in 
the City and County building under the Finance Division not in justice court.  (R. 54; see 
also Appellant Brief at 47.)  As subsection 12.56.570 provides, the hearing officer for 
parking citations can be appointed by the Mayor, which implies supervision by the 
executive branch.13  The exact source of authority for the hearing officers, however, is 
                                                 
13  However cumbersome the process, small claims court has jurisdictional authority 
to hear disputes where the City is attempt to collect an outstanding parking notices and 
the recipient is disputing that obligation.  See Salt Lake City Ordinance § 12.56.570(H); 
see also e.g., Utah Code § 78A-8-102(4) (holding that “counter claims may be 
maintained in small claims court actions if” they arise out of the “same transaction and 
occurrence of the plaintiff’s claim”). 
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irrelevant to the analysis of the Parking Notices here.  Due process does not require the 
government to put the jurisdictional basis for a hearing on a parking ticket.  See, e.g., 
Rector, 348 F.3d at 398 n.1 (providing the physical location and hours of the Denver 
Parking Citations Bureau, but omitting that recipients can talk to a parking referee there).  
Notice must apprise recipients of the pending action and provide an opportunity to 
respond.  See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.    
The Plaintiffs mischaracterize the holding of Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 
(Utah 1983), when they imply that the Parking Notice was required to state the 
distinctions between Justice Court and Small Claims Court.  (See Appellant Brief at 42.)  
In Nelson, the Court found that the plaintiff was denied procedural due process because 
the only notice he had of a pending trial was an oral statement that the case was set for 
“hearing” in two weeks.  Id. at 1212.  He found out that the hearing was a trial two days 
before it started.  Id.  The notice was constitutionally defective because it described the 
nature of the “proceedings in such ambiguous terms that it deprived him of adequate time 
to prepare his defense” and he suffered a judgment of over $80,000.  Id. at 1209, 1212.  
The notice here was adequate because it told recipients exactly how to contact a hearing 
officer to contest a $15 ticket.  The Plaintiffs’ failure to contact the hearing officer at all 
does not reflect a failing of the notice.   
Because the Parking Notice is constitutionally valid, the due process claims of 
Arias and Bivens end here.  The only notice Arias received was the parking notices 
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associated with his tickets.  Bivens received the Small Claims Court Information 
document only once.  However, despite any purported inaccuracies in that document, he 
challenged his ticket and won in small claims court, experiencing no property 
deprivation.   
B. Under the Facts Alleged in the Complaint, the Small Claims Court 
Information Document Does Not Violate Reed’s Due Process Rights.  
 
The only Plaintiff with a due process claim possibly arising from the Small Claims 
Court Information document is Reed.  Reed received one parking notice because she paid 
for the wrong spot.  She sent a friend to challenge the notice before a hearing officer, but 
it was not resolved.  The friend provided her with the Small Claims Information 
document, which Ms. Reed reviewed.  After reviewing the information, she declined to 
initiate a small claims court action because of the “additional expenses outlined in the 
Small Claims Information document.”  (R. 40-41.)  
The City has legal authority to potentially assess each of the fees listed in the 
Small Claims Court Information document.  The prevailing party in a small claims court 
action is entitled to costs, just as the City informs parking notice recipients.  Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-8-107; see also R. 0053, ¶ 84.  In the Court’s discretion, attorney’s fees may 
be assessed under Salt Lake City Code section 12.56.570, which provides that the City 
may institute a collection action if a parking ticket is unsatisfied after 40 days.  Id. 
12.56.570(H); see also Salt Lake City Code § 2.75.040(A); (R. 0053, ¶ 85.)  The Small 
48 
Claims Court Information form explicitly states that “if the judge finds in your favor, you 
will not have to pay anything.”  (Add. at 8-9.)   
The possibility that a losing party could be obligated to pay attorneys’ fees, filing 
fees, or costs is accurate and appropriate for the City to tell citizens.  This warning 
certainly does not rise to a due process violation.  See e.g., Gillespie v. City of 
Northampton, 950 N.E.2d 377, 380-81, 384-386 (2011) (holding that filing fees in excess 
of typical parking tickets do not violate procedural due process); see also Herrada, 275 
F.3d at 557-58 (holding that possible legal consequences of failing to resolve a parking 
ticket are appropriate warnings for a city to give ticket recipients, particularly when 
“nothing in the language suggests that these penalties will be imposed in every 
instance”).  Because no costs are assessed if the parking notice recipient wins in small 
claims court, the Court finds that this case is not akin to Williams v. Redflex Traffic 
Systems, 582 F.3d 617, 620-617 (6th Cir. 2009), where the plaintiff had to pay more than 
the ticket amount just to get a hearing.  Because the fees detailed in the Parking Notice 
and the Small Claims Court Information document are possible consequences of failing 
to take action, they are appropriate warnings for the City to provide, not a violation of 
due process.  Given the facts of the case, the analysis ends here. 14   
                                                 
14  The Plaintiffs make much of a statement in the Small Claims Court Information 
document: “If your complaint is regarding a problem with the way an area is marked, 
whether or not you feel the ordinance is valid and should be changed or how you were 
treated by the issuing officer, the courtroom is not the proper place for those types of 
complaints and will not be addressed by the judge.”  The Plaintiffs take this poorly 
crafted statement and uses it to imply an unconstitutional limitation to which none of the 
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C. The Plaintiffs Do Not Have Standing to Challenge the Small Claims 
Hearing Process Because They Did Not Suffer A Property Deprivation 
as the Result of that Process.   
 
The Plaintiffs have no legal standing to challenge the small claims court hearing 
process because they were never deprived of a property interest as a result of that 
hearing.15  Article I, Section 7 does not “guarantee due process” for the sake of process; 
“it protects against deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due process.”  Rector, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Plaintiffs were actually subjected.  The Court should refrain from analyzing due process 
in the abstract because there is no deprivation from the alleged unconstitutional conduct.  
Rector, 348 F.3d at 943-45.   
Moreover, considered as a whole, the Small Claims Court Information document 
is not constitutionally deficient despite its flaws.  It states, “[i]f you want to contest a 
parking/civil notice before a judge, a court date will be scheduled” and the appropriate 
documents initiating the small claims court process will “be prepared for you to sign.”  
(Add. at 8.)  The document provides the physical location of small claims court, which is 
held at “The Salt Lake City Justice Court.”  Id.  It warns of the necessity of appearing on 
the date specified and the consequences of failing to appear.  It provides information 
about how to seek a continuance.  It advises the recipient to bring “all witnesses and 
documents necessary to prove your claim or defense.”  It provides general information 
about how the City will present its case and who will represent it.  When viewed in its 
entirety, the Small Claims Court Information document does inform the recipient of the 
“pending action and provide an opportunity to respond,” as required.  Rector, 348 F.3d at 
948; see also Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1213 (holding that due process cannot be “reduced to a 
formula with a fixed context unrelated to time, place and circumstances” but instead 
demands a “procedure appropriate to the case and just to the parties involved” (internal 
citations omitted)).   
The second-tier of the City’s process has a statutory basis and can be utilized to 
obtain an impartial hearing and successfully challenge a parking notice, as Mr. Bivens 
proves.  (R. 39.) 
15  The City has repeatedly stated that the Plaintiffs did not request an audience 
before hearing officers or in Small Claims Court and thus that they were not injured by 
the hearing process and suffered no deprivation based on its purported inadequacies.  
Although the City did not use the exact word, “standing,” in the proceedings below, the 
Court can still consider the argument here.  Standing is a jurisdictional requirement that 
can be brought at any stage of the litigation, including on appeal.  Brown v. Division of 
Water Rights of Dept. of Natural Resources, 2010 UT 14, ¶¶ 12-13, 228 P.3d 747. 
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348 F.3d at 943 (invoking the federal corollary) (emphasis added).  Standing requires that 
the Plaintiffs establish “injury, causation, and redressability.”  See Carlton v. Brown, 
2014 UT 6, ¶ 31, 323 P.3d 571.  Without “some claim of specific injury which is causally 
related to the alleged” unconstitutional conduct, the Plaintiffs cannot meet the traditional 
requirements of standing.  Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1151.  The Plaintiffs do not allege that 
their injury — their voluntary payment of each $15-$55 parking notice — was the result 
of inadequacies in the Small Claims Court process.  (R. 38-41.)  In fact, with the 
exception of Bivens’ successful challenge, the Plaintiffs did not avail themselves of the 
Small Claims Court process at all.  Thus, there is no basis upon which they can assert that 
this process was the cause of their property deprivation.  Rector, 348 F.3d at 945 (“Even 
assuming that Denver’s parking tickets are misleading in the sense that Plaintiffs have 
claimed, Mrs. Rector does not have standing to bring the suit and to represent the class, 
because her injury, the payment of the fine, is ‘fairly traceable’ not the alleged defective 
notice but to her lack of any legal defense to the parking ticket.”).  The Court should not 
consider the Plaintiffs’ hypothetical challenge to the City’s two-tiered process. 
D. Although the Court Should Not Evaluate It Hypothetically, the City’s 
Process Satisfies the Requirements of Due Process. 
 
 Due process by its nature requires only the “procedural protections that the given 
situation demands.”  Jordan River Restoration Network, 2012 UT 84, ¶ 50.  To evaluate 
it hypothetically while assuming the worst possible outcomes, as the Plaintiffs do here, is 
contrary to common sense and the law.  The cases the Plaintiffs rely on to claim that the 
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City’s process is unconstitutional are inapplicable because they involve the Court’s 
evaluation of an actual hearing, not a hypothetical one.  (See Appellant’s Brief at 49-
51.)16  
Still, the procedure described in the Parking Notice and Small Claims Court 
Information document satisfy the requirements of due process.  While notice should be 
evaluated under Mullane and its progeny, the adequacy of administrative procedure is 
still evaluated under Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 UT 319 (1976).  See McBride v. Utah 
State Bar, 2010 UT 60, ¶ 19, 242 P.3d 769 (citing Matthews and its progeny to evaluate 
whether due process requires a pre-deprivation hearing).  Here, the district court got the 
analysis right.  (R. 513-14.)   
In examining the challenged process, the Court must balance (i) the property 
interests affected by the governmental action; (ii) the risk of erroneous deprivation, given 
the procedural safeguards in place, and (iii) the government interests served by the 
procedures, including the fiscal and administrative costs of more process.  McBride, 2010 
UT 60, ¶ 20 (citing Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335 (1976)).  The property interest at stake is 
only $15 initially, although increased to $55 in certain instances.  (R. 38-41.)17  There is 
                                                 
16  See Christensen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 315 (Utah 1945) (challenging a 
proceeding that resulted in the revocation of probation); Tolman v. Salt Lake County 
Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 25 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (contesting an actual termination hearing 
before the civil service commission); Bunell v. Industrial Comm’n of Utah, 740 P.2d 
1331 (Utah 1987) (challenging a hearing resulting in the termination of disability 
benefits).  
17  Plaintiffs argue that their claim would not get heard until they paid fees of $485 to 
get to district court because of a sentence in the Small Claims Court Information 
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nothing fundamental about the right to park.  Accord, McBride, 2010 UT 60, ¶ 21.  
Second, the district court was correct that the risk of erroneous deprivation is low.  
Having a hearing officer housed in finance division does not necessarily increase the risk 
of a mistaken property deprivation.  See V-1 Oil Co. v. Dept. of Environ. Quality, 939 
P.2d 1192, 1199, 1203 (Utah 1997) (stating that having an administrative adjudicator in 
the same division as the prosecutors of the action does not violate due process).  
Furthermore, City ordinance provides adequate procedures in its first tier of review 
before a hearing officer.  See Salt Lake City Code § 12.56.570.  The process allows the 
parties to dispute the issue at small claims court, which further guards against an 
erroneous deprivation of $15.  Third, the two-tiered process and time limits for appeal 
conserve administrative resources.  As the Plaintiffs allege, the City issues over 100,000 
parking citations a year, and it needs to quickly and efficiently resolve cases without 
clogging the courts.  (R. 43.)  See McBride, 2010 UT 60, ¶ 29 (stating that the 
                                                                                                                                                             
document saying that Small Claims court is not the place to challenge an ordinance’s 
validity.  (Appellant Brief at 54.)  Plaintiffs assume the worst from this informational 
document.  By ordinance, hearing officers can certainly dismiss tickets if they find “no 
unauthorized use occurred.”  Salt Lake City Code § 12.56.570(D).  To the extent that the 
Plaintiffs are skeptical that hearing officers would agree with their argument about the 
enforceability of the Operative Ordinances, their hesitance to bring the argument 
certainly does not amount to a due process violation.  Likewise, there is nothing in 
ordinance or statute that would prohibit the Plaintiffs from arguing in Small Claims court 
that the City should not obtain a judgment because of their view that the Operative 
Ordinances are invalid or that jurisdiction is improper.  The Plaintiffs’ argument assumes 
that their position would have failed in these other venues, so it did not need to be made, 
but that their assumption of failure should strengthen their due process claims here.  (R. 
53-54.)  Avoiding such confusing and self-serving assumptions is one of the reasons the 
Court should not evaluate this claim hypothetically. 
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government’s strong interest in efficient administration outweighs the plaintiffs’ private 
interest).  A two-tiered process similar to the City’s was found to satisfy due process in 
Gillespie, 950 N.E. 2d at  384-85.  
V. THE PLAINTIFFS LACK PUBLIC INTEREST STANDING.  
Finally, the Court should affirm the district court’s ruling that the Plaintiffs’ lack 
standing to “obtain a refund of fees they were never assessed to begin with” – namely, all 
collection costs, court filing fees, and attorneys’ fees assessed in small claims court 
actions between the spring of 2012 and July of 2014.  (R. 511.)  The Plaintiffs ask the 
Court to invoke “public interest standing” so that they can get this money as a windfall.  
(Appellant Brief at 57.)  The Court should not “readily relieve a plaintiff of the salutary 
requirement of showing a real and personal interest in the dispute” by resorting to the 
public interest exception to standing.  Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 1983). 
Two requirements must be met before the Court can grant public interest standing:  
first, “the issue being presented must be one of sufficient public importance to balance 
the absence of the traditional standing criteria,” and second, the Plaintiffs must be 
appropriate parties to bring suit.  City of Grantsville v. Redevelopment Agency of Tooele 
City, 2010 UT 38, ¶ 16, 233 P.3d 461 (internal citations omitted).   
First, the Plaintiffs’ request for a refund of monies they never paid is not in the 
public interest.  The Court will not extend public interest standing when the issue has 
“only the potential to impact other individuals or entities similarly situated at some future 
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time,” not the public directly.  BV Lending, LLC v. Jordanelle Special Service Dist., 2013 
UT App 9, ¶ 16, 294 P.3d 656 (holding that the plaintiffs did not have public interest 
standing despite alleging unconstitutional notice because their claims did not directly 
impact the public); Gregory v. Shurtleff, 2013 UT 18, ¶ 27, 299 P.3d 1098 (denying 
public interest standing to the plaintiffs who were challenging the constitutionality of the 
Utah Board of Education delegating certain tasks to other government departments and 
private entities because it was not sufficiently in the general interest of the public).   
The Plaintiffs’ claims are not sufficiently in the public interest to circumvent 
traditional standing requirements.  Only a small subset of the public is assessed collection 
fees, attorneys’ fees, and filing costs in small claims court for failing to pay parking 
tickets in Salt Lake City.  It is “difficult to see how allowing the Plaintiffs to “vindicate” 
the rights of this small subset of individuals is a “matter of public importance” at this 
particular point in time, when individuals actually assessed those fees have not sought to 
vindicate their own rights.  BV Lending, LLC, 2013 UT App 9, ¶ 16.   
Second, the Plaintiffs are not “appropriate parties” to assert public interest 
standing.  The analysis in Gregory, 2013 UT 18, ¶ 29 —  that a party is “appropriate” 
based on the quality of his competence — does not appear to have been applied to 
situations where the plaintiffs seek monetary damages for a specific injury.  The 
Plaintiffs’ claims are more akin to Packer v. Utah Attorney General’s Office, 2013 UT 
App 194, 307 P.3d 704, where the court found that the plaintiff was not an appropriate 
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party under the public interest standing analysis because he “lacked a personal interest” 
in the injury he sought to redress.  Id., ¶ 17 (internal citations omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should uphold the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of the 
Plaintiffs’ claims.  There is nothing equitable about what the Plaintiffs are seeking with 
their unjust enrichment claim. They advocate an overly rigid, and ultimately incorrect, 
reading of the Operative Ordinances to imply that equity requires the City to refund all 
parking revenue for a two-year period because it updated its technology.  Their claim 
fails because the Operative Ordinances allow for the technology update, either by their 
terms or alternatively because they only require substantial compliance.  Regardless, the 
Plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim fails because they voluntarily paid their claims.  
Second, the Plaintiffs’ waived their due process claims by paying their parking 
notices without availing themselves of the City’s process.  Even if the Court were to 
consider the merits of the City’s process, it passes constitutional muster.  The Parking 
Notices that the City provided the Plaintiffs notify them of the violation, the required fee, 
and provide an opportunity to object.  Only one plaintiff considered additional 
information in the Small Claims Court Information document, but was deterred by the 
accurate representation of possible fees for losing.  Providing a recipient with information 
about possible consequences does not violate due process. Finally, the Plaintiffs have no 
standing to consider the City's second hearing process because none of them suffered a 
property deprivation because of it. 
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Appellee’s Addendum 
12.56.140 12.56.150 
12.56.140: PARKING METERS; DEFINITIONS AND MARKING OF 
SPACES: 
A. Definitions: 
PARKING 
METER: 
PARKING 
METER SPACE: 
PARKING 
METER TOKEN: 
PARKING 
METER ZONE: 
Means and includes any mechanical device 
installed within or upon the curb or sidewalk 
area immediately contiguous to a parking meter 
space which , when the mechanism thereof is 
set in motion, indicates unexpired parking time 
for the adjacent parked vehicle. 
An area adjacent to a parking meter upon any 
street, and shall be designated by a line or 
other traffic markings, and shall be of sufficient 
size to permit the parking of only one vehicle , or 
not more than two (2) motorcycles. 
A token authorized by the city to be used in a 
parking meter installed by the city in order to set 
in motion the mechanism therein indicating 
unexpired parking time for the adjacent parked 
vehicle . 
Those streets or portions of streets within which 
the parking of vehicles shall be controlled, 
regulated and inspected with the aid and use of 
parking meters. 
B. Parking Meter Spaces To Be Marked: The transportation engineer 
shall establish and designate parking meter spaces by painted lines 
upon the surface of the roadway or pavement and/or curbing. (Ord. 
67-02 § 1, 2002 : Ord. 48-86 § 1, 1986: prior code § 28-3-149) 
12.56. 150: PARKING METERS; INSTALLATION: 
A. The city transportation engineer shall cause to be installed 
contiguous to each designated parking meter space , on a parking 
meter so designated that the deposit of a coin or coins will set the 
mechanism of the meter in motion or permit the mechanism to be set 
in motion, so that the meter will show the unexpired parking time 
applicable to the parking meter space contiguous to the meter, and 
the meter, when such parking time has expired , shall so indicate by 
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12.56.150 12.56.180 
a visible sign. Whenever such sign is visible , the meter is in viola-
tion . 
B. No person shall park any vehicle in any parking meter space , except 
as otherwise permitted by this chapter , without immediately deposit-
ing in the parking meter contiguous to the space such lawful coin or 
coins of the United States as are required for such meter and 
designated by directions on the meter, and when required by the 
direction on the meter, setting in operation the timing mechanism 
thereof in accordance with said directions, unless the parking meter 
indicates at the time such vehicle is parked that an unexpired portion 
remains of the period for which a coin or coins has been previously 
deposited. 
C. No person, except as otherwise provided by this chapter, shall 
permit any vehicle parked by such person to remain parked in any 
parking meter space during any time when the parking meter 
contiguous to such space indicates that no portion remains of the 
period for which the last previous coin or coins have been deposited , 
or beyond the time limited for parking as designated on the meter. 
(Ord. 56-86 § 1, 1986: Ord. 48-86 § 1, 1986: prior code § 28-3-156) 
12.56.160: PARKING METERS; SPACES AND TIME LIMITS: The city 
transportation engineer shall establish and designate parking 
meter spaces, including restricted meter spaces , within the parking meter 
zone , and shall provide for maximum parking times for all meters. (Ord. 
48-86 § 1, 1986: prior code § 28-3-150) 
12.56.170: PARKING METERS; RATES: Parking meter rates shall be 
as set forth in the Salt Lake City consolidated fee schedule. A 
parking meter token may be used in parking meters installed by the city at a 
rate not to exceed one hour of parking per token . Parking meter tokens 
shall not be used as legal tender to satisfy any debt to the city and shall 
only be used in connection with a downtown parking and transit token 
program. (Ord. 50-12, 2012) 
12.56.180: PARKING METERS; RESTRICTED SPACES: No person 
shall park or permit any vehicle to remain parked in a 
restricted parking meter space during a restricted period , except those 
persons included within the class for whose benefit the restriction is 
imposed . (Ord. 48-86 § 1, 1986: prior code § 28-3-152) 
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12.56.190 12.56.200 
12.56.190: PARKING METERS; OVERTIME PARKING PROHIBITED: 
A. No person shall park or permit any vehicle to remain parked in any 
parking meter space adjacent to a meter for a continuous period 
longer than that designated on the meter, or at any time when the 
meter violation indicator is shown. 
B. No person shall place coins in any expired or unexpired parking 
meter for the purpose of showing or extending unexpired time with 
the intent of permitting a vehicle to remain parked at such meter, 
with unexpired time showing for a continuous period longer than that 
designated on the meter. (Ord . 48-86 § 1, 1986: Ord . 62-84 § 1, 
1984: prior code § 28-3-151) 
12.56.200: PARKING METERS; NO CHARGE WHEN: 
A. Parking spaces may be used without charge on all days of the week 
between eight o'clock (8 :00) P.M. and eight o'clock (8:00) A.M., and 
during all hours on Saturdays and on Sundays and holidays as 
enumerated in subsection B of this section . With regard to parking at 
parking spaces on Saturdays, when signs or traffic markings are 
erected or placed by the direction of the city transportation engineer 
limiting the duration of such parking, no person shall park a vehicle 
or permit such vehicle to remain parked for longer than the time 
specified , between the hours shown upon any street, parts of a 
street , or roadway. 
B. 1. The word "holiday" means: 
a. Every Sunday; 
b. January 1, called New Year's Day; 
c. The third Monday of January, called Martin Luther King Jr.'s 
Birthday; 
d. The third Monday of February, called Presidents' Day; 
e. The last Monday in May, called Memorial Day; 
f. July 4, called Independence Day; 
g. July 24, called Pioneer Day; 
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12.56.010: APPLICATION OF CHAPTER PROVISIONS:
The provisions of this chapter prohibiting the standing or parking of a vehicle shall apply at 
all times, or at those times herein specified, or as indicated on official signs, except when it 
is necessary to stop a vehicle to avoid conflict with other traffic or in compliance with the 
directions of a police officer or official traffic control device. (Ord. 48-86 § 1, 1986: prior code 
§ 28-3-142)
12.56.020: REGULATIONS NOT EXCLUSIVE:
The provisions of this chapter imposing a time limit on parking shall not relieve any person 
from the duty to observe other and more restrictive provisions prohibiting or limiting the 
stopping, standing or parking of vehicles in specified places or at specified times. (Ord. 48-
86 § 1, 1986: prior code § 28-3-143)
12.56.040: VEHICLES; REGISTRATION AND PLATES:
Every vehicle at all times while being driven, stopped or parked upon the streets or alleys of 
this city, shall: a) be registered in the name of the owner thereof in accordance with the laws 
of the state, unless such vehicle is not required by the laws of Utah to be registered in this 
state; b) display in proper position two (2) valid, unexpired registration plates, one on the 
front and one on the rear of such vehicle; and c) when required, current validation or indicia 
of registration attached to the rear plate and in a manner complying with the laws of the state 
of Utah, and free from defacement, mutilation, grease and other obscuring matters, so as to 
be plainly visible and legible at all times. However, if such vehicle is not required to be 
registered in this state, and the indicia of registration issued by another state, territory, 
possession or district of the United States, or of a foreign country, substantially complies 
with the provisions hereof, such registration shall be considered as compliance with this 
code. (Ord. 48-86 § 1, 1986: Ord. 62-84 § 1, 1984: prior code § 28-3-177)
12.56.060: PARKING SIGNS REQUIRED:
When by this code or any other ordinance of the city, and except for parking meter zones, 
any parking time limit is imposed or parking is prohibited on designated streets or parts of 
streets the city transportation engineer shall erect or place and maintain appropriate signs or 
traffic markings giving notice thereof and no such regulations shall be effective unless said 
signs or traffic markings are erected and in place at the time of any alleged violation. (Ord. 
48-86 § 1, 1986: prior code § 28-3-148)
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12.56.110: ANGLE OR PARALLEL PARKING; SIGNS OR MARKINGS:
Where signs or traffic markings have been placed by the city transportation engineer after a 
comprehensive study, no person shall park or stand a vehicle other than between such 
traffic markings or at any angle to the curb or edge of the roadway other than indicated by 
such sign or traffic marking. (Ord. 48-86 § 1, 1986: prior code § 28-3-124)
12.96.020: VEHICLES WITH OUTSTANDING PARKING TICKETS:
A. Two Or More Notices Of Unauthorized Use Of Streets (Parking Tickets): Any vehicle that 
has two (2) or more notices of "unauthorized use of streets" within the city, as defined at 
section 12.56.550 of this title, which notices are forty (40) days old or older and have not 
been dismissed pursuant to subsection 12.56.570E of this title, or dismissed or reduced 
to judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be subject to immediate 
impoundment by towing or by means of an immobilizing device.
B. Immobilized Vehicles; Appeal: For vehicles that have been immobilized under this 
section, the city shall collect the fees stated in section 12.96.025 of this chapter and all 
outstanding fees, fines and penalties associated with the parking citations that caused 
the vehicle to be immobilized. Upon payment in full the city shall release the 
immobilization device. This service shall be available by telephone. The vehicle owner 
may appeal the immobilization after obtaining release of the vehicle by submitting to the 
city within five (5) business days a written request for a hearing under section 12.96.090
of this chapter.
C. Delay Of Obtaining Vehicle Immobilization Release: If the vehicle has been immobilized 
for a period of twenty four (24) hours without arrangements being made for its release, it 
may be immediately impounded and towed and removed to a place of storage within the 
city by means of towing or otherwise. In such event, the vehicle owner shall pay towing 
and on street booting release fees as provided under section 12.96.025 of this chapter. 
(Ord. 43-13, 2013)
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§ 10-8-11. Streets--Encroachments, lighting, sprinkling, cleaning, UT ST § 10-8-11
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West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 10. Utah Municipal Code
Chapter 8. Powers and Duties of Municipalities
Part 1. General Powers
U.C.A. 1953 § 10-8-11
§ 10-8-11. Streets--Encroachments, lighting, sprinkling, cleaning
Currentness
They may regulate the use of streets, alleys, avenues, sidewalks, crosswalks, parks and public grounds, prevent and remove
obstructions and encroachments thereon, and provide for the lighting, sprinkling and cleaning of the same.
Credits
Laws 1911, c. 120, § 1; Laws 1915, c. 100, § 1.
Codifications R.S. 1898, § 206, subds. 10-12; C.L. 1907, § 206, subds. 10-12; C.L. 1917, §§ 570x10, 570x11, 570x12; R.S.
1933, § 15-8-11; C. 1943, § 15-8-11.
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